

2. Divisions of Vaibhasika

Three sub-schools:

- Kashmiris
- Aparantakas
- Magadhas

There are also 18 subschools.

3. Etymology

- They follow the *Great **Detailed** Explanation (Mahavibhasa)*. This was not translated into Tibetan until the 20th century, so Tibetans used Vasubhandu's *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge (Abhidharmakosa)* to understand Vai. tenets.
- They propound the three times as **instances** of substance/substantial entities. For example, yesterday's cup, today's cup, and tomorrow's cup all exist substantially and can perform a function.

4. Mode of Asserting Objects

- A [functioning] thing is that which can perform a function. It's synonymous with existent and object of knowledge.
- Thus [functioning] things can be impermanent (a cup, a table, a body), or permanent (uncompounded space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations).

Divisions of existents (objects, objects of knowledge, etc.) acc. to non-Vai schools

Impermanent Phenomena (change every moment)

Three types:

1. Forms (tables, bodies, etc.)
2. Consciousnesses (main minds, mental factors)
3. Abstract Composites (person, time)

Synonyms:

- Functioning thing
- Product
- Compounded phenomena
- Cause
- Effect

Permanent Phenomena (do not change)

Examples of permanent phenomena:

- Non-compounded space (the mere lack of obstructive contact)
- True cessation
- Emptiness (the absence of inherent existence)
- The absence of an elephant in this room

Synonyms:

- Non-product
- Non-compounded phenomenon

The Two Truths

Conventional Truth

A phenomenon such that, if it is physically broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending it ceases (i.e. it ceases to exist as that phenomenon).

Examples: a vase, cloth, a mala, a bicycle.

Ultimate Truth

A phenomenon such that, if it is physically broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending it does not cease (ie it doesn't cease to exist as that phenomenon).

Examples: a partless particle, a partless moment of mind, all permanent phenomena.

The three times are substance /substantial entities

- Yesterday's cup exists today as a past cup; tomorrow's cup exists today as a future cup; today's cup exists today as a present cup.
- Past and future objects are impermanent and can perform functions (e.g. they can be known by mind).
- Other Buddhist schools (except Prasangika) say past & future objects are permanent and can't perform a function. Prasangikas say past and future objects are impermanent and can perform functions.

Substantial vs imputed existence

- A **substantially existent** phenomenon is one that can appear to one's mind without the need for other objects (things other than itself) to appear to the mind.
- An **imputedly existent** phenomenon can only appear to the mind in dependence on other phenomena appearing to the mind. Examples: person, forest.
- Vaibhasikas say ultimate truths are substantially existent, and conventional truths are imputedly existent. But they say conventional truths are substantially *established* because the imputations are true.