**1a. FACSIMILES OF DIRECT PERCEIVERS** (from Dignaga's *Compendium on Prime Cognition*. The first six are conceptual; the seventh is non-conceptual).

- 1. Mistaken conception—a wrong conceptual consciousness, e.g. thinking that sound is permanent.
- 2. Conventional conception—e.g. an inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent.
- 3. Inferential conception—a consciousness apprehending a sign/reason, e.g. a consciousness realizing the three modes in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign, product (i.e. "the subject, sound, is impermanent because it is a product.") This person who has this consciousness is just about to realize the impermanence of sound, i.e. in the next moment they will have an inferential cognizer realizing this.
- 4. Conception arisen from inference—a consciousness arising after an inferential consciousness, i.e. a memory one has after an inference.
- 5. Memory-conception—a consciousness remembering an object from the past.
- 6. Wishing-conception—a consciousness wishing for something in the future.
- 7. "Dimness of sight"—all non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses. These can be sense or mental consciousnesses. Purbujok's text on Lorig explains four types of sense consciousnesses that are wrong, depending on four causes of error:
  - a) the cause of error existing in the basis (e.g. seeing a single moon as two due to a fault in the eye).
  - b) the cause of error existing in the abode (e.g. while sitting in a moving boat, things on the shore appear to be moving).
  - c) the cause of error existing in the object (e.g. when a firebrand is twirled quickly in the dark, it appears like a circle of fire).
  - d) the cause of error existing in the immediately preceding condition (e.g. when the mind is disturbed by hatred, things appear red).

The same text gives as an example of a wrong mental consciousness a dream consciousness that clearly sees as blue the blue of a dream.

## 1b. The difference between appear, apprehend, ascertain, and realize

These are four ways in which the mind can involve itself in an object:

- 1. <u>Appear</u> (snang) This is the most basic possibility, in that the object merely appears to the mind. For example, everything that is one nature with a table (its shape, color, impermanence, etc.) appears when the table appears. However, something that appears may not be ascertained or realized.
- 2. <u>Apprehend</u> ('dzin) Apprehend means "hold" or "grasp"; it means the consciousness merely engages the object.
- 3. <u>Ascertain</u> (nges) An ascertaining consciousness is able to induce a recollection of what appears to it, so it involves more than an object merely appearing. The object has been registered on the consciousness.
- 4. <u>Realize</u> (rtogs) For a mind to realize its object means that the mind is able to 1) lead to a correct ascertainment of the object, and 2) eliminate misconceptions about it (e.g. realizing blue as blue, and not red).

## 2. INFERENTIAL COGNIZERS (ই রা'ন্যান্/ rjes dpag)

Definition: A determinative knower which, depending on its basis, a correct sign, is incontrovertible with regard to its object of comprehension, a hidden phenomenon.

An inferential cognizer is always conceptual, and thus is always mistaken with respect to its appearing object. However, it is always incontrovertible, and thus is always unmistaken with respect to its engaged object, which is a hidden phenomena, e.g. subtle impermanence. It always arises in dependence on a correct sign, e.g. "product" in the proof of sound as impermanent. A correct sign is defined as **that which is the three modes** (the three modes are: property of the subject, forward pervasion, and counter pervasion).

Is an inferential cognizer necessarily a prime cognizer? There are different assertions about this. Some scholars (e.g. Purbujok, Jetsun Chokyi Gyeltsen) say that inferential cognizers *are* necessarily prime cognizers; that means only the first moment of an inferential realization is a prime cognizer (and thus they include the term "new" in the definition of an inferential cognizer). They assert that the second, third, etc. moments of that realization are no longer inferential cognizers but are just *subsequent cognizers*.

Other scholars (e.g. Panchen Sonam Dragpa, Geshe Jambel Sampel) say that inferential cognizers are *not* necessarily prime cognizers; the second moment etc. are *inferential subsequent cognizers*. Thus they have a separate definition for an *inferential prime cognizer* (the same as above but including the words "new and" before "incontrovertable").

For example, let's say Karen realizes sound to be impermanent, based on a correct sign. Both groups of scholars agree that the first moment of that realization is an *inferential prime cognizer*. What they disagree about is what to call the second moment onwards of that realization. The first group calls them *subsequent cognizers*, and the second group calls them *inferential subsequent cognizers*.

There are three types of inferential cognizers:

1. <u>Inference through the power of the fact</u>—this arises in dependence on a correct sign of the power of the fact, and is used to realize slightly hidden phenomena. Examples: *"The subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product,"* and *"With respect to the subject, on a smoky pass, fire exists because smoke exists."* 

2. Inference through renown—this is used to realize terminological suitability. The classic example is: "The subject, rabbit-bearer, is suitable to be expressed by the term 'moon' because of existing among objects of thought," but we could also say "The subject, John, is suitable to be expressed by the term 'moon' because of existing among objects of thought." Whatever is an object of thought can be called by any term.
3. Inference through belief—this is used to realize very hidden phenomena, such as the very subtle workings of cause and effect, which can only be known by a buddha. An example: "The subject, the scripture, 'Through giving, resources; through ethics, happy migrations,' is preceded by a valid cognition that realizes the meaning that is its object of indication because of being a scripture that is devoid of the three contradictions.