

# Presentation of Mind and Awareness

## Composite of All the Important Points, Opener of the Eye of New Intelligence

By Geshe Jampel Sampel

Having bowed down to the glorious Losang Drakpa, emanation of Manjughosha, treasury of wisdom, I extend this presentation of mind and awareness, composite of all the important points, in order to increase the clarity of knowledge of those with low intelligence.

This presentation of mind and awareness has three parts: 1) definitions, 2) divisions, and 3) the meaning of each division.

### Definitions

A knower is the definition of a mind. That which is clear and knowing (luminous and aware) is the definition of a consciousness. The three – mind (*blo*), awareness (knower, *rig pa*), and consciousness (*shes pa*) – are synonymous.

### Divisions

There are three divisions of mind and awareness: into seven, three and two. The division into seven consists of 1) direct perceiver, 2) inference, 3) subsequent cognizer, 4) correct assumer, 5) inattentive perceivers, 6) doubt, and 7) wrong consciousness.

#### 1. Direct Perceivers

The explanation of direct perceivers has two parts: definitions and divisions. An unmistakened<sup>1</sup> knower that is free from conceptuality is the definition of a direct perceiver.

A new,<sup>2</sup> incontrovertible,<sup>3</sup> unmistakened knower that is free from conceptuality is the definition of a directly perceiving reliable cognizer.

When direct perceivers are divided, there are four: sense, mental, apperception, and yogic direct perceivers.

##### A. Sense direct perceivers

An unmistakened, non-conceptual knower that is produced from its own uncommon empowering condition, a physical sense power, is the definition of a sense direct perceiver.

When sense direct perceivers are divided, there are five: those apprehending 1) forms, 2) sounds, 3) odors, 4) tastes, and 5) tangible objects.

---

<sup>1</sup> It is unmistakened in terms of its appearing and observed objects; there is no erroneous element in what is appearing to consciousness.” Unmistaken knower” is sufficient as the definition of direct perceiver. “Free from conception” is added to eliminate the Vaisheshika’s view that sense consciousnesses are conceptual

<sup>2</sup> *Pramana* is reliable cognizer. According to Sautrantika, “*pra*” refers to the first moment of mind that realizes its object by its own power, not through the force of a previous reliable cognizer that induces it. To Prasangika “*pra*” means main, i.e. it comprehends its main object.

<sup>3</sup> *Mind slu ba*, undeceived. It has eliminated superimpositions on its object and has realized its object.

An unmistakable, non-conceptual knower that is produced in dependence on its own uncommon empowering condition, the eye sense power, and an observed object condition, a form, is the definition of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form. Apply this (definition) similarly to the other (divisions of sense direct perceivers).

## **B. Mental direct perceivers**

An unmistakable, non-conceptual knower that arises from its own uncommon empowering condition, a mental sense power is the definition of a mental direct perceiver.

When mental direct perceivers are divided, there are two; those that are and are not “indicated on this occasion.”

A non-conceptual, unmistakable other-knower indicated on this occasion that arises from its own uncommon empowering condition, a mental sense power, is the definition of a mental direct perceiver indicated on this occasion.

When mental direct perceivers indicated on this occasion are divided, there are five, ranging from those apprehending forms to those apprehending tangible objects.

With respect to how mental direct perceivers indicated on this occasion are produced, there are three assertions: 1) alternating production, 2) production of three types, and 3) production only at the end of a continuum. From among these the mode of alternating production is as follows: the first moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form is produced; subsequently the first moment of a mental direct perceiver apprehending the form is produced; subsequently the second moment of the sense direct perceiver apprehending the form is produced, and so on. They assert that between each moment of sense direct perception a moment of mental direct perception is produced.

The mode of production of three types is asserted as follows: the three – the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form, the first moment of a mental direct perceiver apprehending that form, and the apperceptive direct perceiver experiencing those two – are produced simultaneously. In brief, it is asserted that two types directed outward and one type directed inward are produced at one time.

The mode of production only at the end of a continuum is the thought of the foremost father (Tsongkhapa) and his spiritual child (Gyeltsap). Here a mental direct perceiver apprehending a form is produced only at the end of the last moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form. Furthermore, it is clear in the textbook (Panchen Sonam Drakpa’s commentary on *Dharmakirti’s Commentary on (Dignaga’s) “Compendium on Reliable Cognition”*) that it is necessary to assert that in the continuum of one who looks nearby (i.e. an ordinary being) no more than one smallest moment of a mental direct perceiver apprehending a form is produced.

“Indicated on this occasion” must be understood as referring to the occasion where it is said (in sutra): “Consciousnesses of forms are of two types: those depending on the eye and on the mind.”

Mental direct perceivers not indicated on this occasion are such (consciousnesses) as a clairvoyance which knows another’s mind.

## **C. Apperceptive direct perceivers**

That which has the aspect of an apprehender is the definition of an apperception.

That which is non-conceptual, unmistaken and has the aspect of an apprehender is the definition of an apperceptive direct perceiver.

When apperceptive direct perceivers are divided, there are three: 1) those that are reliable cognizers, 2) those that are subsequent cognizers, and 3) those to which an object appears but is not ascertained.

#### **D. Yogic direct perceiver**

A non-conceptual, unmistaken exalted knower in the continuum of an arya that is produced from a meditative stabilization that is a union of serenity and insight and that has become its own uncommon empowering condition is the definition of a yogic direct perceiver.

When yogic direct perceivers are divided there are three: those of hearers, solitary realizers, and mahayanists.

It is said that apperceptive and yogic direct perceivers must be mental direct perceivers.

These definitions are from the viewpoint of the Sautrantikas. However, the Cittamatrins and the Yogachara (Svatantrika)-Madyamikas give (as the definition of a direct perceiver) a non-conceptual knower arisen from stable predispositions.

Also, with respect to briefly explaining the presentation of facsimiles of direct perceivers,<sup>4</sup> (Dignaga's *Compendium on Prime Cognition* says: "Mistaken (conception),<sup>5</sup> conventional consciousness,<sup>6</sup> inference,<sup>7</sup> (conception arisen from inference,<sup>8</sup> memory,<sup>9</sup> and wishing-conception<sup>10</sup>) are facsimiles of direct perceivers along with dimness of sight.<sup>11</sup>" Thus seven facsimiles of direct perceivers are asserted: six conceptual and one non-conceptual.

In the root text of Dharmakirti's *Commentary of (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition"* these are condensed into four. If you wish to know about these in more detail, please look in the *Rado Mind and Awareness* and in (Panchen Sonam Drakpa's) *Illumination of the Thought* on the third chapter (of Dharmakirti's *Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Reliable Cognition"*) and so forth.

## **2. Inferential cognizers**

A determinative knower<sup>12</sup> which, depending on its basis, a correct sign, is incontrovertible with regard to its object of comprehension,<sup>13</sup> an obscure phenomenon,<sup>14</sup> is the definition of an inferential cognizer.

---

<sup>4</sup> A knower that is mistaken with respect to its appearing object.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. conception apprehending sound to be permanent.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. inference realizing sound is impermanent.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. a mind realizing the three criteria in proof that sou is impermanent and is about to realize sound is impermanent. It is not an actual inference.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. a memory induced by inference.

<sup>9</sup> Remembering something from the past.

<sup>10</sup> Wishing for something in the future.

<sup>11</sup> E.g. due to cataracts. This is non-conceptual.

<sup>12</sup> *Zhen rig*, an awareness thinking, "This is such and such."

<sup>13</sup> *Gzhal bya*, the actual object the mind is getting at, what the mind realizes. Synonymous with engaged object and apprehended object.

A determinative knower which, depending on its basis, a correct sign, is new and incontrovertible with regard to its object of comprehension, an obscure phenomenon, is the definition of an inferential reliable cognizer. It is said that an inferential cognizer is not necessarily a reliable cognizer.

When inferential cognizers are divided, there are three:

1. Inference depending on authoritative testimony (inference through belief)
2. Inference through renown
3. Inference by the power of the fact

A determinative knower which, depending on its basis, a correct sign depending on scripture, is incontrovertible with regard to its object of comprehension, a very obscure phenomenon, is the definition of an inferential cognizer depending on authoritative testimony. An illustration is the inferential consciousness which realizes that the scripture, “From giving, resources; from ethical conduct, a fortunate (migration)” is incontrovertible with respect to the meaning indicated by it.

A determinative knower which, depending on its basis, a correct sign of renown, is incontrovertible with respect to its object of comprehension, a terminological suitability, is the definition of an inferential cognizer through renown. An illustration is the inferential consciousness that realizes it is suitable to express the rabbit-possessor by the term “moon.”

A determinative knower which depending on its basis, a correct sign by the power of the fact, is incontrovertible with respect to its object of comprehension, a slightly obscure phenomenon, is the definition of an inferential consciousness by the power of the fact. An illustration is the inferential consciousness which realizes that sound is impermanent.

### 3. Subsequent cognizers

A knower which realizes that which has already been realized is the definition of a subsequent cognizer.

When subsequent cognizers are divided, there are two: 1) direct and 2) conceptual subsequent cognizers.

There are four direct subsequent cognizers: 1) sense, 2) mental, 3) apperceptive, and 4) yogic.

There are two conceptual subsequent cognizers: 1) those induced by a direct perceiver and 2) those induced by inference. An illustration of a conceptual subsequent cognizer induced by a direct perceiver is a consciousness ascertaining blue which is produced subsequent to a direct perceiver apprehending blue; an illustration of a conceptual subsequent cognizer induced by inference is the second moment of an inferential consciousness that realizes sound to be impermanent.

This is because it says in Dharmottara’s, *The Correct*, “The two – the first moment of a direct perceiver or of an inferential consciousness – are reliable cognizers, but later moments which do not differ in establishment and abiding and are continuations of them have forsaken being

---

<sup>14</sup> An object which is actually realized by an inferential, new reliable cognizer. It is opposed to an obvious or manifest object which is one that is actually realized by a direct, new reliable cognizer.

reliable cognizers.” Sameness in establishment and abiding on this occasion is said to refer to sameness of effect.

#### 4. Correct assumer

A knower that does not get at an object with respect to which superimpositions have been eliminated although it adheres one-pointedly to the phenomenon which is its principal object of engagement is the definition of a correct assumer.

When correctly assumers are divided, there are three: 1) without reason, 2) without ascertaining the reason, and 3) depending on a facsimile of a reason.

An illustration of a correct assumer without a reason is a mind that thinks, “Sound is impermanent,” without any reason at all. An illustration of a correct assumer without ascertaining the reason is a mind which thinks, “Sound is impermanent,” based on the sign of being a product, but without having ascertained that sound is a product and that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent. An illustration of a correct assumer depending on a facsimile of a reason is a mind that thinks, “Sound is impermanent,” from the sign of being an object of comprehension.

Similarly, Sagya Pandita’s *Treasury of Reasoning* says, “Correct assumers are not more than three: 1) not depending on a sign – being only an assertion it can turn into doubt – 2) depending on a “correct” sign, or 3) (depending on ) a facsimile of a sign.”

Also posited as the definition of a correct assumer is: a determinative knower that, without depending on either experience or a correct sign which is its basis, apprehends one-pointedly and unmistakably its object of engagement but does not get at an object with respect to which superimpositions have been eliminated.

Here “experience” should be taken as referring to its not depending on any of the three – 1) experience arisen from meditation, 2) experience of apperception, or 3) clear experience which is not mixed with a conceptual appearance.

If the definition is posited in this way, I think that whatever is a mind would not necessarily be one of the seven minds. This is because the meditative stabilization on ugliness or great compassion in the continuum of a learner, etc. – those included within realizations in the scope of method – are not suitable to be correct assumers as they depend on experience arisen from meditation, and are not suitable to be wrong consciousnesses as they are not affected by the causes of error, and it is easy to understand how they are not the others. I think this, and it should be examined.

#### 5. Inattentive perceivers<sup>15</sup>

A knower to which the specifically characterized phenomenon<sup>16</sup> that is its engaged object<sup>17</sup> clearly appears but which is unable to induce ascertainment with respect to it is the definition of an inattentive perceiver.

When inattentive perceivers are divided, there are three: 1) sense, 2) mental, and 3) apperceptive direct perceivers that are minds to which an object appears but is not ascertained.

---

<sup>15</sup> A mind to which the object appears but is not ascertained.

<sup>16</sup> A phenomenon which is ultimately able to perform a function (Sautrantika definition)

<sup>17</sup> *jug yul*, main object with which the mind is concerned.

Yogic direct perceivers which are such do not exist because any yogic direct perceiver must realize its object. This is because it says in Dharmakirti's *Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Prime Cognition,"* "From just seeing, the great intelligent ones ascertain all aspects."

An illustration of a sense direct perceiver which is an inattentive perceiver is a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue that induces the doubt, "Did I see blue or not?"

An illustration of a mental direct perceiver which is an inattentive perceiver is a mental direct perceiver apprehending a form in the continuum of an ordinary being.

An illustration of an apperception which is an inattentive perceiver is an apperception in the continuum of a nihilist that experiences an inference as a reliable cognizer.

## **6. Doubt**

A knower which by its own power has qualms in two directions is the definition of a doubt.

When doubt is divided, there are three: 1) tending toward the fact, 2) not tending toward the fact, and 3) both equally.

An illustration of doubt tending toward the fact is a two-pointed mind thinking, "Sound is probably impermanent."

An illustration of doubt not tending to the fact is a two-pointed mind thinking, "Sound is probably permanent."

An illustration of equal doubt is a hesitating consciousness which wonders whether sound is permanent or impermanent.

## **7. Wrong consciousnesses**

A knower which is mistaken with regard to its engaged object is the definition of a wrong consciousness.

When wrong consciousnesses are divided, there are two: 1) conceptual and 2) non-conceptual.

Illustrations of conceptual wrong consciousnesses are a thought consciousness apprehending the horns of a rabbit and a consciousness apprehending a self of persons.

There are two types of non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses: 1) sense and 2) mental. Wrong sense consciousnesses are, for example, a sense consciousness seeing two moons or a sense consciousness to which snow mountains appear blue. A wrong mental consciousness is, for example, a dream consciousness to which blue clearly appears.

The division of mind and awareness into three consists of 1) conceptual consciousnesses that take a conceptual appearance as their apprehended object, 2) non-conceptual, unmistaken consciousnesses that take a specifically characterized phenomenon as their apprehended object, and 3) non-conceptual, mistaken consciousnesses that take a clearly appearing non-existent as their apprehended object.

Conceptual consciousness that takes a conceptual appearance as its apprehended object and conceptual consciousness are synonymous. Non-conceptual, unmistaken consciousness that takes a specifically characterized phenomenon as its apprehended object and direct perceiver are synonymous. Non-conceptual mistaken consciousness that takes a clearly appearing non-existent as its apprehended object and non-conceptual, wrong consciousness are synonymous.